The Volatile Mistress

By WAJAHAT ALI

Javed Jabbar served as General Pervez Musharraf’s Minister of Information. Here he talks to CounterPuncher Wajahat Ali about Pakistan General Musharraf, the nation’s relationship to the United States, and the current State of Emergency.

ALI: What was your initial impression of Musharraf when you were Minister of Information in 1999? Did you believe him, back then, when he said he would make Pakistan a democratic nation?

JABBAR: First of all, I happened to know him from 7 years before joining his cabinet. I had a personal friendship with him. I knew him as a person and thought he had a progressive view of the world. He is strongly in favor of women’s right and empowerment. And, at that time, he genuinely wanted to help improve the political value system and political practices so that Pakistan’s democratic process could be subject to ethical and more accountable frameworks that had been practiced in recent years.

I shared that vision, and I think he was genuine in that conviction.

ALI: Do you think that same conviction motivated his recent declaration of the State of Emergency, which some claim is essentially a mini Martial Law?

JABBAR: You’re taking a giant leap of 7 years. (Chuckles.) First of all this process went through phases. The first year I served with him as advisor on National Affairs and Minister of Information, I saw the process partially implemented but there were signs of variation in those lines of vision and long term objectives I initially shared with him. Which is why in October 2000, I decided to resign from the cabinet.

Over the 7 years from 2000 to 2007, he took several actions which were progressively at variance at where we started out from. First of all, in April 2002, he made the decision to hold a Referendum and assume the office of President for 5 years after that date. Secondly, the manner in which the results of the 2002 elections were not allowed to be accurately reflected was a problem. The results were reflective of fairly free and general elections, because the People’s Party of Benazir Bhutto secured the highest number of votes in the party. And it was only after several members of her party deviated from the party leadership’s direction and agreed to support Musharraf that his chosen prime ministerial nominee, Mister Zafarullah Jamali, was elected with the barest of margins. He had a one vote majority in the National Assembly ­it came down to a single vote. That’s how narrow it was.

Therefore, when people say the October 2002 elections were entirely rigged, I beg to disagree. If it was rigged, then it would be on a much bigger scale, then the People’s Party could not have been shown to be the party that owned the highest number of votes. So, a major point of disagreement was how the results of the 2002 election were manipulated or distorted.

Then, between 2002 and 2007, there was the decision to work with elements who were clearly not part of the ethical and the more accountable political value system with which he came into power ­ this had become very apparent. So, my disagreement grew sharper.

ALI: What is an example of that element?

JABBAR: I would not like to name individuals. I do not as a matter of policy make references to specific personalities. Everyone knows who these people and those elements are.

ALI: Ok, fair enough.

JABBAR: Therefore, last year in July 2006, I was involved in part of the process called the Civil Military Dialogue, including several former generals of the Pakistan Army, several former Cabinet Ministers, and leaders of civil society and scholars. We are a group of about 20 people. We decided to address an open public plea to General Musharraf and to the heads of the political parties, because we felt firmly that the post of President and Chief of Army Staff should be held by two separate people. The Presidency is a political position, and we urged the General to retire from the Chief of Army Staff.

Secondly, we called for a truly independent commission and genuine enforcement of accountability and not selective accountability. We also urged political leaders to avoid polarizing the situation and using extreme rhetoric. We also urged the forces of liberalism and tolerance and moderation to unite to fight the threats of extremists and fanatics who use violence.

Unfortunately, our call was ignored by Musharraf. [Musharraf recently stepped down as Chief of the Army, however the State of Emergency has not been lifted.] The results became horrendously evident in 2007 beginning with his very considered action against the Chief Justice in March. It has been a rapid and progressive decline since then.

It has been a progressive deterioriation; however allow me to say that on the other hand his major contribution has been the allocation for deserved seats for women to the extent of 33% [representation] in all local government levels and village levels, which is a revolutionary change. This leaves far behind many other Western countries. Even they don’t have this abundance of women’s participation at the grassroots level. Equally, he assured that 17 seats are reserved in the provincial and National legislature for women. Now, reserved seats are not the ideal way to improve the participation of women, but in a society where there are so many barriers, it has had a salutary or symbolic effect. Over the coming years it will help to significantly improve women’s developments and women rights.

A second major contribution has been the introduction of private and independent television channels and radio stations, with which I was associated and I had written the original law in 1997. But the elected government of Nawaz Sharif had scrapped the law. During my cabinet tenure with Musharraf, it was revived. And finally after I left the cabinet, it was enforced. There has been a dramatic transformation of Pakistan’s media landscape from a state monopoly of electronic media to a situation where there are at least 35 television channels and 70 private radio stations.

Tragically, Musharraf’s latest acts [The State of Emergency resulting in the sacking of judges, the shutting down of private media outlets, the arrests of activist lawyers and human rights members] have banned or suspended a significant achievement of his own tenure which was fairly unique. Nowhere else in the world was private media so openly and daily critical of a serving Chief of Army Staff. So, these are two major credits. Third, there was a significant improvement in the macro-economic indicators by which the size of the Pakistani economy increased, foreign investment increased, market capitalization increased, and business activity increased. Also, there were vast phenomenal increases in higher education, and also an opening of access to telecommunications for the average citizen.

So, I’ll conclude my very long response. I went into detail to give you an idea that while one strongly condemns what has recently happened, one should retain a sense of balance and see what the credits have been. He should have resisted from the steps he had taken, because those progressive elements that resulted from the measures that I have just listed, have now being alienated. On the one hand, he is already fighting irrational indoctrinated fanatics, and now those who are progressive in their approach, those who are liberal and tolerant, even they have become alienated. It is a very dire situation to end up alienating both extremes.

ALI: I wanted to ask specifically then what is your take on his current State of Emergency, and what are the potential blowbacks resulting from it?

JJ: First of all, the consequences will be extremely negative in the long term for Pakistani’s institutional development and cohesion. It has been a terrible blow to the process to strengthening the independence and autonomy of institutions: the media, the judiciary, the checks and balances. The second consequence will be a degree of introspection in the media itself. Sometimes, not always, but sometime private media have used new freedoms in a somewhat unbridled, if not excessive, way. All freedoms should be subject to some sense of moderation. To show for example during live telecasts the killing and willful gratuitous violence is, on one hand, reporting what you are seeing, but on the other hand it is inciting people to revenge or apathy or insensitivity. On the long term basis, more important, the General should make distinctions between what suits his interests and what is in the country’s interests. For example, while The Supreme Court was listening to a case that dealt directly with his eligibility, there was no basis for him to take this action [Declaring a State of Emergency that sacked all the judges who were following the Constitution and ruling against his wishes]. As far as the threat from terrorists, the State of Emergency may arbitrarily give more powers to government, but this is not an effective response. The cure, the attempted cure, was from the same disease.

ALI: Many say this might be the last throng of his power. If there is a power vacuum as a result of his actions, who will fill it up? Bhutto? The military? The extremists? This is a main concern for America.

JJ: We must go to history and realize that Pakistan’s constitution offers many rational options and ways to respond to a power vacuum. On the 17th of August 1988 when Zia died in an air crash [General Zia al Haq was Pakistan's military dictator from 1977 to 1988] , immediately thereafter as per the constitution, the Chairman of the Senate took over as President of the Country and as per the Constitution, elections were held within 3 months in November. I fervently wished that Musharraf remains alive and well, but if there is any change in the status of who remains President or Army Chief, then we should look to the Constitutional process. I am absolutely confident that the people of Pakistan are capable of producing alternatives. Some of them might not be ideal, but eventually we are capable of producing the appropriate alternatives.

ALI: What are the motivations of the U.S. in dealing with Musharraf and Bhutto right now? Many, in U.S. at least, are suspicious of Pakistan’s motives, and many in Pakistan of course believe Musharraf is merely a tool of the U.S. So, how does this relationship play in the current geo-political climate, specifically between U.S., Musharaff, and Bhutto.

JJ: Yes, on the face of it there is the interest of the U.S. to align themselves with elements whom they think are in tune with their ideals and values. This is a superficial reading. Yes, certainly, Musharraf and Bhutto represent those parts and citizens of Pakistan that abhor violence, that are against extremism and fanaticism. Equally, however, the degree to which Pakistan has collaborated and cooperated with the U.S. has clearly alienated the people in Pakistan who have these same liberal values. There is a need to assert Pakistani autonomy and identity, and it has been done to be fair. Even while collaborating with the U.S., it is unfair to call Musharraf a complete tool of U.S. Policy because on Nuclear Proliferation charges, he has not allowed A.Q. Khan [The Pakistani scientist known as the "Father of Pakistan's Nuclear Program" alleged to have sold nuclear secrets and information to neighboring countries] to be interviewed by either the IAEA or by representatives of the U.S. Government. He has very clearly said “No.” So, Pakistan is not just putty in the hands of the U.S. government. No Pakistani will simply say, “yes, sir” to whatever the State Department or U.S. Government wants.

ALI: How real is the threat of extremism, specifically Pro-Taliban parties taking control of Pakistan?

JJ: The threat is very real. Second, the threat emanates from a small, microscopic number of people. It does not represent the overwhelming nature of the Pakistani people whose nature is peaceful and hospitable. Third, we have to guard against the ease with which a small minority can derail a whole process whether through violence or through political power. Fourth, one indicator is the religious parties in Pakistan, who not always are the violent ones since there are many non-violent religious parties as well. In the only province in the federation where they had unqualified power in the past 5 years in the NWFP [The North West Frontier Province of Pakistan known for feudalism, tribalism and religious conservatism] , in the October 2002 elections the religious alliances gained only a small part of the vote, because only 34% of the electorate in the NWFP casted votes. Out of the 34%, the religious alliance got only 15-20% of the votes.

So, 80% of the province which is supposed to have dominance of religious forces didn’t even bother to express their allegiance to the religious parties! But, the threat from extremism is real and it is real like anywhere else in the world. It needs to be combated vigorously without qualification on several fronts.

ALI: Last question – What are the key steps for Pakistan to gain some proactive grounds towards a functional democracy? Is there hope?

JJ: The best step would be the restoration of the Constitution without any dilution of it democratic, political nature. Number two, a distinctive and clear separation between the civil political process and the ole of military. Number three, a genuinely independent and powerful election commission with complete executive authority at the grassroots level to ensure truly authentic elections. Finally, number four, maturity and strength from the leadership of the political parties to cooperate and prevent the situation from further deterioration.

Wajahat Ali is a playwright, essayist, humorist, and J.D. whose work, “The Domestic Crusaders,” (www.domesticcrusaders.com) is the first major play about Muslim Americans living in a post 9-11 America. He can be reached at wajahatmali@gmail.com

Privatizing Terror, Outsourcing Diplomacy

By WAJAHAT ALI

The international outcry over the recent Blackwater shootings forced the world to closely examine and appreciate the complex reality of the United States government’s overdependence on private military contractors operating in Iraq. The foremost expert and most cited authority on the subject is Peter Warren Singer, a senior fellow at the prestigious Brookings Institute, co-founder of “The U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World” Program, and author of the seminal work on private military contractors, “Corporate Warriors.” This interview, his most recent, examines the most current repercussions caused by the Blackwater scandal and private military firms within an overall context of The Iraq War, U.S. Foreign policy in the Middle East, and America’s public relations with the Muslim world.

WAJAHAT ALI: Ok, the first question is an easy one. A fastball right down the middle regarding Blackwater (An American Private Military firm contracted by the U.S. government to provide security in Iraq). On September 16, Blackwater was involved in a catastrophic shooting incident in Iraq’s Nisoor Square leaving nearly 20 Iraqi civilians dead. Are you at all shocked or surprised by this revelation?

P.W. SINGER: No. Short answer, no. Long answer is that–look, I’ve been researching and writing on private military firms for over a decade now. My book, Corporate Warriors, dealt with this issue even before the Iraq War. Since the war started the outsourcing of military functions has been put on steroids not only in terms of the growth of it, but also in terms of the negative aspects coming out of that growth. The incident in question regarding Blackwater needs to be put in a proper context. It’s just one company out of 181 other private military companies operating in that space in Iraq. The incidents involving abuses of private military contractors go back to the starting of the war. This includes the incidents at Abu Ghraib (Torture Scandal) and the private contractor Aegis Trophy’s infamous video of 2005 (Aegis employees posted a video online showing them shooting at Iraqi civilians.) You also had the Triple Canopy shootings lawsuit in ’06. Blackwater is just one of the companies in the game.

Within Blackwater itself there have been multiple incidents well before this most recent one. An example is The Christmas Eve shooting where a Blackwater contractor allegedly got drunk, got into an argument inside the Green Zone with one of the Iraqi Vice President’s security guards, and then shot him and killed him. It’s been over 10 months since that happened. Weeks before the Nisoor Square September shooting, there were multiple incidents involving the Iraqi Interior Ministry. There was one such incident where an Interior Ministry employee was killed, one where there was an armed standoff between Blackwater contractors and the Iraqi police in which the U.S. military actually had to intervene. One of the U.S. government officials, embedded in the Iraqi Interior Ministry, described this as a “powder keg of anger.” That powder keg exploded several weeks later (The September Nisoor Square shooting in Iraq). To answer your question, no, I wasn’t surprised. Absolutely not.

The Iraqi government had some harsh words recently for Blackwater, publicly saying, “Blackwater uses employees who disrespect the rights of Iraqi citizens even though they are guests in the country.” Could this statement also describe the conduct of the U.S. forces and other American private firms operating in Iraq?

The Iraqi government understands that Blackwater is only one player within a much larger industry–the Iraqis understand that also. They (Blackwater) have become some sort of a symbol. If you ask most contractors, I am dubious that they would see themselves as “guests of the Iraqi government.” Most see themselves carrying out a contract, and the client in that contract is not the Iraqi government. It usually is the United States government or United States subcontractors. They view Iraqi governments with a great deal of suspicion. Remember, we are talking about an Iraqi Interior Ministry that just couple of weeks ago an investigation board found to be completely corrupt. The Ministry acted basically as a cover for a number of sectarian militias operating in Iraq, and the recommendation of the investigation board was that the best thing one can do for Iraq was to shut the Ministry down and start over again. So there are a lot of fingers that can be pointed in lot of directions.

At the end of the day, Iraq is starting to act like sovereign state. Sovereign states want to control the forces within their borders–that’s what makes them sovereign. That holds equally true for sectarian militia as it does for private military firms operating out there. They are outside the control of the government, or at least what should be the control of government. The point is if Iraq is to be a sovereign state, it needs to be resting control over this, and to be honest, this is how you get the U.S. out of there–you let Iraq have institutions that are able to carry out their jobs as a government.

Has the global microscope on the Blackwater scandal caused an overall strain between the Iraqi and US governments? If so, what are the repercussions in the “Muslim world” and also on the ground when dealing with the Iraqi insurgency?

The United States government aspect of it is – that the unfortunate truth is while contractors are carrying out a number of critical and important missions, the overall effect of their use has actually been undermining rather than assisting U.S. operations and goals. It extends all the way to tactical levels on the field to the grand strategic world.

To the question of the relationship between the Iraqi and U.S. government, it’s very interesting remember you need to put this into context. One week before the shootings in Nisoor square (September ’07), General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker (U.S. envoy to Iraq) testified to Congress about the “surge strategy.” Now, there was huge debate whether the military aspects of the surge strategy were being met or not. They really went back and forth on that. Now, one thing they did talk about was the 43 Iraqi citizens who were shot in Baghdad alone by private contractors that same week. When we talk about what President Bush refers to as a “Return to normalcy” in Iraq–this doesn’t feel all that normal, does it? There was no debate at all about the political aspects. Everyone (in Congress) on both sides of the aisle universally agreed that in the year ahead we would have to press the Iraqi government to finally take some action on the political benchmarks. The key to the “surge strategy” success was dependant on this.

Now, let’s move forward just one week–within the span of that 20 minute Blackwater gun fight (September ’07 Nisoor Square shooting) –that whole strategy falls by the wayside. A couple hours later, Secretary Condoleeza Rice calls up Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, which is extraordinary because she normally doesn’t call him. When she calls to speak with him personally, she doesn’t press him on the really important issues, such as, “We need you to pass the oil law,” or “We need you to deal with the amnesty issues”–both critical political benchmarks.

Instead, she calls to express her sympathies and to apologize for this Blackwater incident. Over the next week, she and Ambassador Crocker have to keep going back to the Iraqis, and they are almost actually begging them to let Blackwater get back into business (Resuming their routine operations in Iraq), because if Blackwater can’t operate, then the United States embassy is effectively shut down. This is the complete vulnerability that the United States has created for our operations there in Iraq by depending on private contractors.

One week later, Bush meets with Prime Minister Maliki face to face. They were already scheduled to have this meeting, but now the whole point of the meeting changes. Top of the agenda is no longer, “Prime Minister Maliki, we really need you to get serious about these sectarian killings, because if they don’t end, we don’t end this war, and I don’t get my troops home.” Instead, top of the agenda is Blackwater. So, basically this a manner in which private contractor action completely skews the relationship between two governments and undermines the overall strategy.

Now, the second question asks what does this do to the broader, as some people like to say “War of ideas,” or however you want to phrase it, regarding the broader Muslim world. And here, too, this is a complete hammer to our image; a hammer to our public diplomacy. Some U.S. military officers on the scene described this as “bad as Abu Ghraib.” I personally disagree with that, but it points to the level of negativity. While private contractors are seen as convenient, temporary manpower shift, it’s a way of dis-involving your public (American citizens), and it doesn’t play that way “outside” (Iraq). When incidents happen, the Iraqis don’t just focus on the private companies, instead they blame the U.S. government.

The Blackwater “Nisoor Square” shooting incident resonated negatively not only inside Iraq but throughout the Muslim world. A variety of major media out there in the Middle East like Al Jazeera reported on the Blackwater contractors as “an army that seeks fame, fortune and thrills away from all considerations and ethics of military honor. The employees are known for their roughness, they are known for shooting indiscriminately at vehicles or pedestrians.” Even the Daily Star, the regional English language newspaper which is probably one of the most moderate voices in the region, compared the uses of the company to the Mahdi army (Militant Shiite insurgency in Iraq) and put the Mahdi army in a positive light saying “at least they (The Mahdi army) can plausibly claim to be defending their community. No foreign mercenary can plead similar motivations. So, all of them should go.” These are all really major quotes, but the timing of it happens at the very same moment that Secretary Rice is in the region trying to save her historic legacy by jump starting the Arab-Israel peace process. Most people would agree the Arab-Israel situation is the real key in sucking the poison out of Muslim-U.S. relations. And instead of her efforts being positive for any kind of U.S. public diplomacy, every commentator (in Iraq) called the conference she was attending “The BlackWater- Black Heart Conference.” It is just a hammer blow to our public diplomacy.

The second thing which is fascinating to me is the reaction by Blackwater. While the Arab press is roiling, and it’s being covered in other parts of the Muslim world like Indonesia and Pakistan negatively, how did the company react?

That’s a great lead in to a question I have regarding Erick Prince, the chairman and owner of Blackwater, who recently testified on Capitol Hill and predictably defended his company’s actions.

I was there for all 5 hours of it.

Were you just steaming in the back, fuming the whole time?

Yes (Laughs). To be completely honest.

If you were on the panel, what questions would you have asked? Some key questions you thought were on point and went unasked by the panel?

Well the event played out two ways. One side was craven and the other side was clueless. One side kept going, “Mr. Prince tell us how great you are, tell us how wonderful you are, tell us how special you are.” The other side asked questions that were scatterbrained, all over the place, and didn’t deal with the issue at hand. So, I have here a couple of questions that would have been interesting if answered.

I would have asked him bout the series of incidents involving his company that date back to 2004. They range from sending out men on a mission to Fallujah without proper equipment, vehicles, training, or even good directions that led to their death, as well helping the Iraqi insurgency.

A simple yes or no question would have been, “Has your firm, based on these patterns of incidents, faced any legal or disciplinary actions from the U.S. government? Have they (the guilty contractors) ever been prosecuted, or lost a contract, or been fined for anything based on this?” Because it seems, as far as the record shows, that the only people to take action, to create consequences when there has been negative effect, has not been the folks (The U.S. Government) paying these contractors. It’s been three groups onlyy:

1) The four mothers of the Blackwater employees killed in Fallujah.

2) The parents of the men who were killed in the Blackwater plane crash that resulted from their firm’s actions in Afghanistan.

3) And now, The Iraqi government that just got fed up waiting for our government to do something.

Here’s another question I would’ve asked: “We understand that you fired the person that got into a drunken argument on Christmas Eve and killed the Iraqi Vice President’s security guard. Our question is who flew him out of the country? Which entity made the decision to get that individual out of the country 36 hours after they potentially committed a murder, which in effect assured prosecution would be difficult and impede the investigation? Was Blackwater operating under its own discretion? Or, were they ordered to do so by its clients and the State Department? Who was it?”

Another one is “Why do your helicopters in Iraq not carry any identifying insignia, such as the numbers painted on U.S. Army vehicles? Is there something that sets the company aside from standard U.S. tactics?

It would have been very interesting to ask him, “Isn’t it interesting that the same government individual, who has been reported by one investigative committee to have made the initial decision for Blackwater to get its first contract, is the brother of the current State Department Inspector General, who was found, by the same committee, to have intervened in preventing an investigation into Blackwater’s illegal activity?”

These are some examples of the actual questions we could’ve asked. Instead, one side wanted to talk about everything from Moveon.org to diabetes medication. And the other side oddly kept asking Eric Prince why he didn’t prosecute his employees, but conceded ultimately that he couldn’t because he was just a C.E.O. of a company.

However, what’s good is that no one can claim they don’t know about this anymore. Now, when there are negative consequences, they (The U.S.) have to deal with them. But they couldn’t claim that before. For example, in 2006 in a public setting right across the street from me, President Bush was asked about the legal status and accountability of private military contractors in Iraq. One student questioned him, and Bush answered with a giggle, you can see this on the web, just Google it. Bush ultimately said, “I’m gonna ask Rumsfeld about it when I get back.” If that question had been answered a year ago, we wouldn’t be in this problem todaybut, it wasn’t.

Your research has borne many egregious example of private contractors’ reckless conduct in Iraq–including the Blackwater shootings, CACI and Titan firms responsible for the notorious Abu Ghraib interrogations, and Aegis Company’s “trophy video” in which they posted a video of them shooting at civilians to an Elvis song on the net. What I and others want to know is what legal repercussions do they face, if any, under international law and U.S. law?

What could happen, or what will happen? I mean there are multiple laws that could be applied. Iraqis are claiming that since Blackwater didn’t have a license to operate in Iraq, they didn’t fall under the immunity laws protecting other private military contractors (Initiated under Paul Bremer in 2003 as head of the CPA).

They also say they want Blackwater to pay over $100 million dollars to the families of the shooting victims. So, instead of sounding like they were trying to ensure rule of law, it actually sounded like an extortion attempt. They undermined their stance.

Now, there’s also application of U.S. civilian law. There is a law in the books called Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Basically, it says if you are working for the U.S. government abroad in a military setting, and you commit a felony, then we can potentially prosecute you back home. It has only been utilized twice in Iraq. One time when a contractor came back and was found with child porn on his computer, and another time when there was an attempted rape of a U.S. reservist by a contractor. The challenge of this law is that it gets difficult when you add a non-U.S. victim and a “battlefield environment” like we have in Iraq. So, it’ll be hard to ask a civilian jury sitting in the U.S. that we want you, the jury, to not only decide whether a law was broken, but whether the “rules of engagement” in a “battlefield environment” were broken as well. It is very difficult.

Another method is the Uniform Code of Military Justice – the court martial system. In October 2006, the law was changed to allow private contractors to fall under it, and it is probably the most apt one in finding these Blackwater contractors involved in the Nisoor square shooting liable. They were involved in a combat zone, an operational setting, and the question is did they violate the rules of engagement or not? The problem of that is that the law was passed in October, but the Pentagon never issued a procedure to its JAG officers on how to actually use it.

So, is there some semblance of hope that there could be legal accountability?

Could be, but again, it’s political will that matters most. With Blackwater, it’s like one of those things when projecting the stock market, do you look at past behavior and past facts? Or, do you try and project forward? Using past facts, you shouldn’t expect anything to happen. Projecting forward? There’s enough attention around this now that you might seem some action along the side – but not major action.

We’ve woken up to the fact that the emperor has no clothes, but right now all we’re willing to do is to ask him to please put a scarf on.

In your article “America, Islam, and the 9-11 War” you state, “The erosion of American credibility in Muslim world not only reinforces recruiting efforts of its foes, but denies Americans ideas and policies a fair hearing.” How does this play out in Iraq?

The U.S. was in a strong position during the Cold War with being internationally viewed as a “beacon on the hill.” It both had power, but also more importantly, popularity and respect. It wasn’t that we had the Atom bomb, but it was also that we had McDonalds and Coca Cola. We had universities people wanted to come to. We had blue jeans. Now, we have power, but now it’s not as easy to apply it in the current conflict. Instead of being seen as that “beacon”, America, “the land of blue jeans”, has become internationally viewed as the “land of armed jumped suits.” And that is not a positive when you’re dealing with the problem at hand.

It is not that the U.S. is locked in some battle with the broader Muslim World. That is simply false. But you do have a really weird international change, where for the first time a state and a religion are looking at each other through a different lens–a lens of misperceptions. It is a lens of ignorance, but also a lens of anger. And it’s getting worse, and we have to recognize that. It’s actually fulfilling Bin Laden’s wishes, he wanted this kind of conflict, and it is creating it. It’s both on how we conduct ourselves, but also how we speak to the world.

Peter, you’re the co-founding Director of the Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World at the Saban Center at Brookings. In your experience and opinion, how do we convince the Muslim world that our actions, whether they are rooted in “regime change”, or “humanitarian” or “reform” efforts, are not mere tools of American imperialism?

Basically there was an era where the U.S. had it right, and Louis Armstrong sang about it during his jazz tours when he went around the world on behalf of the United States. Louis Armstrong wasn’t a stooge, but he spoke the truth and that compared very positively to what they, the people, were seeing from the Soviet Union. But the line that encapsulates what we need to do today is to “Accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative.”

There are clearly things that are dragging us down and are not all that useful. Accentuate the positive. There are lot of things that the U.S. does like help local NGOs on the ground, and investment in education. We have an amazing spirit as a nation, in terms of not just with the government does, but what the broad base of American society does. We do that but we can do a lot more.

For our generation, this is the equivalent of our cold war. This is our calling: to bridge this growing divide between the U.S. and the Muslim world. It’s incumbent on us whether we are in government or outside government. Whether we are a corporation or an NGO. Whether it’s faith based or not, it’s incumbent on us to bridge this divide.

The same thing goes for the clear negatives that are dragging us down. Those are easy to pick off, you know, most people universally recognize that while the Arab-Israeli peace will not be easy in any shape, way, or form, at least showing action on it is something we can do, instead of ignoring the problem. Same thing goes for GITMO (Guantanamo Bay). We painted ourselves in a corner with that, and we need to find a way out.

Iraq. It’s very clear that not only now is it a half trillion dollar investment gone bad, but in terms of U.S. funds, that money could have been spent on lot more effective things. Like I’ve said, it has been hammer to our public diplomacy.

And finally, the problem with our relationship via authoritarian leaders in the Middle East region. It is clear we have struck a deal with the devils and we are not getting much out of that deal – and that is true. We can pick off the regimes where that is happening and not only does that not help our battles with the extremist groups, but it also undermines our broader effort to speak on behalf of democracy every time we cozy up to a dictator. Clearly, we have to start to disentangle ourselves and start to pressure them on some of the things they can do. An example, I’d say to a current ally, “Buddy, we love what you’re doing in giving us intelligence, although it’s sorta funny you only give us intelligence a day before one of our senior official visits. But, we don’t really like what you did to crack down on free media or that you jailed democracy activists. We are not going to turn aside from that anymore.”

We have a record of doing that–that type of dialogue – and it worked in the transformation within South Korea during the Cold War, the transformation that happened within Philippines is another example. We can have a similar attitude towards our very ostensible authoritarian allies.

What of “Islamofascism”: An accurate assessment of our enemy or a politically convenient and sexy, new term of choice by certain ideological pundits?

It’s not new, and no one likes it. It was a stupid, stupid phrase to use in the first place. It was completely politicized, and they very quickly realized that. Now, the flip side is there are certain people running with it these days to make it appear that the broader U.S. really does believe this term.

Can there honestly be a lasting peace between the United States and the “Muslim world” in our lifetime, or this just whimsical naiveté?

I think there can be, but it’s not going to come in a matter of years. It’s going to be generational and maybe even multigenerational if we are going to be honest about it. But the fact is there are all sorts of amazing transformation and changes that are going on in the world. This is only one part of it. In part, it’s because the world is changing so fast, but I think there are things that can happen. The problem for us on the U.S. side is that we’ve really wasted the first couple of years of this (Post 9-11). We could’ve done things more positively, and we did a lot negatively that we are going to be dealing with the consequences for at least a generation. But that doesn’t meant all is lost.

Look at the French and the Germans. They spent literally almost a millennium fighting each other. If you would’ve said in 1945, “The French and German would later be part of this grand consortium. They would have a fairly closely aligned foreign policy and domestic policy. They would be sharing laws, sharing economics, basically they are not going to be considering each other as enemies, but considering themselves as friends they can’t live without.” If you would’ve said that in 1945, someone would’ve sent you to the Loony Bin. So, we can take hope from those examples. There we are today.

Wajahat Ali is a playwright, essayist, humorist, and J.D. whose work, “The Domestic Crusaders,” (www.domesticcrusaders.com) is the first major play about Muslim Americans living in a post 9-11 America. He can be reached at wajahatmali@gmail.com

On Islamo-Fascism and Other Vacuous Epithets

By WAJAHAT ALI

Wajahat Ali speaks to American political scientist and writer Dr. Norman Finkelstein about the denial of his tenure at DePaul University, anti-Semitism, and challenging the academic status quo on the Palestine-Israel conflict.

WAJAHAT ALI: In the recent DePaul University tenure controversy, you and a vocal community of supporters suggested “external pressures” forced the University to deny you tenure despite your overwhelming popularity and respect amongst your peers and students. What is your response to this denial?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: I do not want to be a tenure martyr. It was for sure a disgusting ordeal. But my main concern now is to move on and put it behind me. Reasonable people do not doubt why I was denied tenure. The facts are straightforward. I easily met all the criteria of tenure at DePaul. I was denied tenure due to my vocal opposition to Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories.

Regarding your scholarship, you question and challenge what some consider long-held assumptions regarding the Israeli-Palestine conflict, specifically the actual intentions and motivations of several parties, such as the Israeli government, the United States, and the Arab world. Currently, what do you believe are the most crucial and major obstacles that if removed, could establish some sustainable semblance of peace in that region?

The basic terms for settling the conflict are not a mystery. They are embodied every year in the same General Assembly resolution titled “Peaceful Settlement of the Palestine Question.” The resolution calls for full Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 borders. The entire world apart from the U.S., Israel and this or that South Pacific atoll (Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, Micronesia, Marshall Islands) supports this settlement. Once the U.S. and Israel accept the G.A. resolution, the basis will be in place to resolve the conflict.

In your book Beyond Chutzpah, you present evidence against Dr. Alan Dershowitz’s book, Case for Israel, and conclude that his work is a mixture of plagiarism, shoddy research, and poor scholarship. If Dr. Dershowitz’s book is filled with so much error, how do such works become authoritative pieces on the subject?

To win acclaim in mainstream media on certain subjects you merely have to echo the party line; it has precious little to do with actual scholarship. The Nazi holocaust and the Israel-Palestine conflict are two such subjects. Terrorism is another one. I just read this ridiculous book by a so-called leading American intellectual named Paul Berman entitled Terror and Liberalism. The book is fact-free. Indeed, it might be called insane in a rational culture. It starts from the premise that no country in the world has done more for Muslims than the United States. That’s the central premise. You can imagine where it goes from there. Of course it’s a huge bestseller in the United States. It’s hard to imagine how debased U.S. intellectual culture is. Although, in all fairness, I doubt it has yet sunk to the level of France where Bernard Henri-Levy is called a philosopher.

In your controversial book, The Holocaust Industry, you make two arguments. One is that the promotion of the uniqueness of “Jewish suffering” experienced during the Holocaust is used to shield and deflect legitimate criticism of Israel. The second builds upon this and says that this promotion allows a powerful industry to label any such critic, no matter how legitimate, an Anti-Semite. How has this “labeling” played out in recent years in regard to critics of Israeli domestic and internal policies?

Whenever Israel comes under international pressure to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict diplomatically or on account of its human rights violations, it revives the extravaganza called The New Anti-Semitism. In 1974 the Anti-Defamation League, an Israel lobby group in the U.S., put out a book called The New Anti-Semitism and in 1981 it put out another book called The Real Anti-Semitism. Right after the new intifada began, the Israel lobby again started with The New Anti-Semitism. The purposes of this agitprop are pretty obvious: to delegitimize all criticism of Israel as motivated by anti-Semitism and to turn the perpetrators into the victims. It seems to have less effect in recent years due to overuse: once you start calling Jimmy Carter an anti-Semite, people really begin to wonder.

Anyone who knows this “info-tainment industry” well knows that “scholarship” and polemical histrionics make loyal bedfellows, thus explaining the phenomenon of shock jocks, right wing radio hosts, and the rise of polemical pundits.
What is the role of the professional and ethical academic and historian, specifically one whose concentration deals with the Middle East, in today’s hysterical society? Does your experience with DePaul University signal a warning call to those who tread what some consider your controversial path?

I don’t think my personal experience has much wider meaning. I was targeted because I am politically active. I don’t limit myself to a professional audience of other academics. I have a public reputation, and it was this reputation that the Israel lobby was trying to discredit, successfully, as it turns out. But most academics speak to other academics.

The “Muslim World” has gained a considerable spotlight after 9-11 with pundits commenting on the “clash of civilizations,” “the roots of Muslim rage,” and the newest label suggesting an emergence of “Islamo-fascism”. You have had considerable experience with Muslims and Muslim Americans.Do you believe that a conflict exists between the so-called West and Islam? If so, how can we, as an American society, regain Muslim trust, confidence, and understanding specifically in light of the Iraq War, the Palestine-Israel conflict, and the aggressive rhetoric against Iran, which some Muslims claim is ample proof of a war on Islam rather than realpolitik?

“Islamo-fascism” is a meaningless term. If I am not mistaken, it was coined by the commentator Christopher Hitchens. The term is a throwback to when juvenile leftists, myself among them, labeled everyone we disagreed with a “fascist pig.” So this is a kosher-halal version of that epithet. Fascism used to refer to a fairly precise historical phenomenon, although it’s even doubtful that the term accurately encompasses regimes as different as Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany. But when you start using the term to characterize terrorist bands who want to turn the clock back several centuries and resurrect the Caliphate, it is simply a vacuous epithet like “Evil Empire,” “Axis of Evil” and the rest.

Your parents survived the Warsaw Ghetto and the Auschwitz concentration camp. Your published works and scholarship, although labeled Anti-Semitic by your critics, are generally dedicated by yourself to honoring and preserving the integrity of those victims, such as your parents from those you claim exploit their suFfering for political ends. Like others in your field, you could have easily avoided controversy by agreeing with the mainstream. With all the issues you have faced as a result of your scholarship, what has motivated you to continue down this road?

Whenever I wonder why I do what I do – and I do have those moments of self-doubt – I put in my mind’s eye the suffering of my late parents, I think of my friends in the occupied territories, and the doubts vanish. I press on, knowing that soon I will pass from the scene, hopefully having done some good, and not too much evil.

Wajahat Ali is a playwright, essayist, humorist, and J.D. whose work, “The Domestic Crusaders,” (www.domesticcrusaders.com) is the first major play about Muslim Americans living in a post 9-11 America. He can be reached at wajahatmali@gmail.com